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ThePolitical Response
to the Devaluation
Despitethe overvaluation of the rupee and the chaotic and inefficient pat-
tern of subsidization that had developed in that situation, the 1966 devaluation
was to run up against intense political reaction. This was to make it nearly
impossible for the government to gain either real political support for the mea-
sure ex-ante or a rational appraisal of its success ex-post. An analysis of the
factors underlying this outcome is necessary in order to learn lessons, not
merely for Indian policy-making, so that some of the pitfalls can be avoided
the next time around; there are more general lessons for the policy-makers
elsewhere too.1
The political impact of a devaluation, and hence the alignment of pres-
sure groups, is usually conceived of in terms of the following factors: (1) op-
position parties can be expected to play upon issues of national prestige as
well as on the theme that government policies have led to this "debacle";
and (2) a devaluation that improves the payments imbalance may be expected
to draw support from the export sector and to be resented by importing
interests.
The Indian devaluation, both economically and politically, was a more
complex phenomenon, but it was not entirely an unusual phenomenon for a
developing country attempting to liberalize its payments regime. Among its
important features were:
1. The government was energetically pushed into devaluation by the
aid consortium which made large-scale significant resumption of aid practi-
cally conditional on India's changing the parity.2
2. The government was in a pre-election year and also relatively weak
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in having a new Prime Minister (Mrs. Indira Gandhi;) whose leadership of
her party was not yet consolidated.
3. The government's long-standing refusal to devalue, which was over-
come in part by a consortium offer to increase the (pre-suspension) level of
annual commodity aid from about $400 million to $900 million, had led for a
number of years, and in particular during the preceding year 1965—66, to
strenuous propaganda that stressed the alleged demerits of devaluation. On
l:he other hand, with the exception of a few economists, there had been no
convincing and sustained argumentation in support of a devaluation; hence
the public stage had been occupied almost exclusively by the opponents of
devaluation, largely official.
4. Finally, the devaluation, as we have noted in Chapter 6, was accom-
panied by simultaneous changes in export subsidies arid import duties. This
implied that the objectives of the measure were, for the most part, those of
merely "rationalizing" the existing system rather than of seeking a large "net"
devaluation; this was little understood and was a major source of confusion
and misdirected criticism. It also implied that the objections to the devalua-
tion were likely to come from those hurt by these accompanying changes.
At the same time, the substantial increase in commodity aid promised by the
consortium meant that the supporters would include those benefiting from
increased, liberalized imports.
The remarkably unfavorable political reception accorded the 1966 de-
'valuation in the period immediately after its announcement is readily ex-
plained once the following factors are taken into account.
1. The government failed toelicit significant support from its own
(Congress) party, either in Parliament or from the party's Executive Corn-
mittee members; in fact, several senior Congress party members openly ex-
pressed criticism or skepticism. Some of the flak came from members who
•were clearly worried about the oncoming election arid found the measure
risky, as all governments seem to do, in that the government might lose
prestige or be blamed for unpopular price increases. Others were offended
at the secrecy and at not 'having been consulted on such an important decision,
forgetting that secrecy is inherent in such a decision. This group included
senior members of the Congress party who had maneuvered successfully to
make Mrs. Gandhi the Prime Minister and feared that she was becoming inde-
pendent, and also others (such as a former Finance Minister) who had long
opposed devaluation. Yet others, essentially on the left in the Congress party,
who had welcomed the succession of Mrs. Gandhi to premiership against
a right-wing contender as promising a turn to the left in Indian economic
policy, thought that the devaluation that they characterized as a "surrender"
to the consortium's demands, signified that they had been wrong and wanted
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own party. In short, the relative weakness of Mrs. Gandhi's position in her
own party, the failure of her new government to project a clear political image
and the impending election made the prospect of getting broad-based sup-
port from her own party very dim indeed. As it turned out, only a handful
of Cabinet Ministers who had been consulted on the final decision were to
be articulate in their support of the devaluation, the contributions of other
prominent members of the Congress party being one of lukewarm defense
or, more generally, that of mild skepticism ranging up to outright criticism.
2. Three circumstances combined to convert the customary tendency of
most opposition parties to denounce devaluation as a "defeat" of the govern-
ment and an "admission" of its failures into a concerted denunciation in
stronger tones: (a) For some years preceding the devaluation, in response
to frequent rumors based on alleged World Bank and IMF recommendations
to that effect and in response to the writings of some domestic economists,
the government had indulged in strenuous propaganda against devaluation;
this was particularly the case with the annual reports of the Ministry of Com-
merce and of International Trade. (b) Supporters of a more realistic exchange
rate policy had opted out of the debate on the question since the early 1960s.
This meant that the largely spurious arguments put out by official agencies
against an adjustment in the exchange rates were left unanswered. (c) Finally,
these two facts, in conjunction with the financial inducement and pressures
by the consortium, led to a situation where public opinion was generally re-
ceptive to the notion that the devaluation was economically unsound and was
imposed on the country for "non-economic" reasons.3
Two factors therefore became critical in determining the overall response
to the devaluation: (a) resentment at foreign influence itself, accentuated in
turn by the notion that India could no longer control her own policies in her
own interest; and (b) the widespread feeling that the devaluation had to be
judged ultimately by what it signified beyond itself in broader political and
economic terms.
3. Thus, the minority that supported (or did not oppose) the devaluation
was confined to (a) economists who chose to assess the measure within its
own terms, (b) several industrial groups which saw the measure as signifying
an impending move toward a larger role for private enterprise and less
"socialism," (c) a few isolated exporting groups whose benefit from the
devaluation outweighed their loss from the simultaneous elimination of the
earlier export subsidies and (d) producer groups that saw sufficient profits
resulting from the raw-material-import liberalization that would follow from
the grant of significant aid after devaluation.
4. These were, however, outweighed in political terms and in articulation
by the critics. The alleged economic demerits of the decision and the perceived
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points of criticism from political parties on the left as well as the right, in
Parliament and in the press. (Only the laissez-faire and industry-oriented
right-wing Swatantra Party was schizophrenically positioned for reasons
spelled out in the preceding paragraph.) In addition, the parties of the left
were particularly articulate about their fear that the devaluation represented
the turning point for progressive sacrifice of socialist policies regarding private
foreign investment and private dcimestic enterprise. The critics also included
the overwhelming majority of exporters who saw that the major thrust of
the devaluation was aimed at reducing reliance on the ad hoc and selective
export subsidies which had indeed proved very lucrative to the influential
exporters.
All in all, therefore, the devaluation ran into an unusually hostile re-
ception. The political lessons seem particularly pointed with regard to the use
of aid as a means of influencing recipient policy, even if, in some objective
sense, the pressure is in the "right" direction. The Indian experience is also
instructive for the political timing of a devaluation: foreign pressure to change
policies, if brought to bear when a government is weak (both for internal-
structural reasons and because of an impending election, which invariably
prompts cautious behavior), can be fatal. Mason and Asher, in their study
of the World Bank, characterize the Indian case as "perhaps the most strik-
example of attempts by the Bank to use 'leverage' to bring about changes
a borrowing government's 'performance'" and one which "did not leave
the Bank's relations with India unscathed."4
To say that there should be no "performance conditioning" in providing
aid is not to suggest that there should be no evaluation of aid utilization. We
think, however, that such evaluation and subsequent pressure for policy
change, if any, must also recognize that economic analysis is rarely so com-
pelling as to command universal approbation—even if one does not quite
take the cynical attitude that where you have six economists, you get seven
opinions. Indeed, there is much to be said, if the aid relationship is to be
mature and relatively free from the frictions of the preceding decade, for
the donors' influence to take the form of advice rathe:r than prescription. In
this regard, it is well worth noting that the Soviet practice of confining scrutiny
to the performance of aid-financed projects, and not attempting to evaluate
and influence the whole plan or set of economic policies of the recipient
country, has helped to avoid the kind of adverse reaction the Western donors
have provoked, however well intentioned their pressures may have been.5
Here we again have that paradox of political economy: that a program ap-
proach, which makes much sense from an economic po:int of view (given sub-
stitution possibilities), makes little sense from a political point of view.
We also do not share the view that pressure to change major policies
by foreign donors, especially of the type applied to India in 1966, is helpful154 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
because it "strengthens the hands" of those who, within the recipient country,
want the "right" policies adopted. It is the opinion of nearly all of those few
who had argued for a devaluation in the Indian context during the period
preceding June 1966 that the external role at the time of devaluation com-
promised their political viability.6
NOTES
1. The following analysis and conclusions are based on an extensive examination of
the relevant documents such as newspapers, journals, Lok Sabha proceedings and Rajya
Sabha proceedings. The reactions and pronouncements of politicians(in and out of
office), political parties, newspaper editorials, influential magazines and journals, indus-
trial and business groups, and economists were examined. The analysis is thus confined
to the so-called "elite groups"; besides itis primarily a medium-run response analysis,
though there is little reason to think that anyone really changed his position on the
policy option exercised by the government in June 1966, in light of longer-run develop-
ments. The only exception is the Prime Minister herself (who is reported to have been
less than enthusiastic about the policy changes in light of the tremendous opposition that
they elicited). Our full-length analysis (with K. Sundaram) has been published in three
parts in Economic and Political Weekly, September 2, 9 and 16, 1972.
2. Note, however, that PL 480 food aid was continued throughout this period and
that aid already in the pipeline was not halted either; only fresh commitments were held
up by the U.S., though even here two new loan agreements were signed by the U.S. with
India between October 1965 and June 1966. Note that aid to both India and Pakistan
had originally been suspended during the war of October 1965.
3. This widely accepted view failed, of course', to recognize that the economic
aspects of the problem had been discussed at length for several months prior to the
decision to devalue. The Finance Ministry had before it an extensive report on the current
export subsidies and the merits of a devaluation, which it had commissioned from
J. Bhagwati, then at Delhi University, during mid-1965. Besides, other economists had
also written in support of a new parity. Most of the major contributions on the subject
have been reprinted in Devaluation of the Rupee and its implications (New Delhi:
Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 1966). In addition, see K. N. Raj,
"Food, Fertiliser and Foreign Aid," Mainstream, April 30,1966; C. N. Vakil, The
Devaluation of the Rupee (Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House, 1966); and B. N.
Ganguli, Devaluation o/the Rupee (Delhi: Ranjit Printers and Publishers, 1966).
4. Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 197. This study also stresses
what the authors consider to be the disappointing features of India's economic per-
formance that led the Bank, with the strong support of the United States, to press for
reform of India's balance of payments and agricultural policies in particular.
5. Note, however, that we do not mean to imply that Soviet aid has been entirely
without friction. For an interesting account and analysis of difficulties in the case of
Soviet financing of the Indian steel plant at Bokaro, see Desai, Bokaro, especially
Chapters 5—7.
6. In particular, the adverse political consequences of the 1966 experience may well
have had a lasting impact on the ability of the official economists to argue for exchange
rate flexibility in the future without being condemned as unwitting, if not willing, tools ofTHE POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE DEVALUATION 155
capitalistdonors. In a country such as India, where the word "socialism" wins elections
rather than loses them, as in the United States, an official's(as well as a Congress
politician's) efficacy and possibly even his ability to get ahead in life depend significantly
on whether he can operate within the broad framework of mild-to-strong left-wing
politics. And one has only to examine the Indian response at the time of the Smithsonian
parity changes (discussed in Chapter 11) to see the force of the point that, even in the
long run, the ability of officials to press successfully for exchange rate flexibility was
compromised by the 1966 experience.